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Dopamine: Generalization and Bonuses
Abstract
In the temporal difference model of primate dopamine neurons, their phasic activity reports a prediction error
for future reward. This model is supported by a wealth of experimental data. However, in certain
circumstances, the activity of the dopamine cells seems anomalous under the model, as they respond in
particular ways to stimuli that are not obviously related to predictions of reward. In this paper, we address two
important sets of anomalies, those having to do with generalization and novelty. Generalization responses are
treated as the natural consequence of partial information; novelty responses are treated by the suggestion that
dopamine cells multiplex information about reward bonuses, including exploration bonuses and shaping
bonuses. We interpret this additional role for dopamine in terms of the mechanistic attentional and
psychomotor effects of dopamine, having the computational role of guiding exploration.
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Abstract 
Substantial data support a temporal difference (TO) model of 
dopamine (OA) neuron activity in which the cells provide a global 
error signal for reinforcement learning. However, in certain cir-
cumstances, OA activity seems anomalous under the TO model, 
responding to non-rewarding stimuli. We address these anoma-
lies by suggesting that OA cells multiplex information about re-
ward bonuses, including Sutton's exploration bonuses and Ng et 
al's non-distorting shaping bonuses. We interpret this additional 
role for OA in terms of the unconditional attentional and psy-
chomotor effects of dopamine, having the computational role of 
guiding exploration. 
1 Introduction 
Much evidence suggests that dopamine cells in the primate midbrain play an im-
portant role in reward and action learning. Electrophysiological studies support 
a theory that OA cells signal a global prediction error for summed future reward 
in appetitive conditioning tasks (Montague et al, 1996; Schultz et al, 1997), in the 
form of a temporal difference prediction error term. This term can simultaneously 
be used to train predictions (in the model, the projections of the OA cells in the 
ventral tegmental area to the limbic system and the ventral striatum) and to train 
actions (the projections of OA cells in the substantia nigra to the dorsal striatum 
and motor and premotor cortex). Appetitive prediction learning is associated with 
classical conditioning, the task of learning which stimuli are associated with re-
ward; appetitive action learning is associated with instrumental conditioning, the 
task of learning actions that result in reward delivery. 
The computational role of dopamine in reward learning is controversial for two 
main reasons (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Redgrave et al, 1999). First, stimuli that 
are not associated with reward prediction are known to activate the dopamine sys-
tem persistently, including in particular stimuli that are novel and salient, or that 
physically resemble other stimuli that do predict reward (Schultz, 1998). Second, 
dopamine release is associated with a set of motor effects, such as species- and 
stimulus-specific approach behaviors, that seem either irrelevant or detrimental to 
the delivery of reward. We call these unconditional effects. 
In this paper, we study this apparently anomalous activation of the OA system, 
suggesting that it multiplexes information about bonuses, potentially including ex-
ploration bonuses (Sutton, 1990; Dayan & Sejnowski, 1996) and shaping bonuses 
(Ng et al, 1999), on top of reward prediction errors. These responses are associated 
with the unconditional effects of OA, and are part of an attentional system. 
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Figure 1: Activity of individual DA neurons - though substantial data suggest the homogeneous 
character of these responses (Schultz, 1998). See text for description. The latency and duration of the 
DA activation is about lOOms. The depression has duration of about 200 ms. The baseline spike rate is 
about 2-4 Hz. Adapted from Schultz et al (1990, 1992, & 1993) and Jacobs et al (1997). 
2 DA Activity 
Figure 1 shows three different types of dopamine responses that have been ob-
served by Schultz et al and Jacobs et al. Figures 1A;B show the response to a con-
ditioned stimulus that becomes predictive of reward (CS+). For this, in early trials 
(figure 1A), there is no, or only a weak response to the CS+, but a strong response 
just after the time of delivery of the reward. In later trials (figure 18), after learn-
ing is complete (but before overtraining), the DA cells are activated in response to 
the stimulus, and fire at background rates to the reward. Indeed, if the reward is 
omitted, there is depression of DA activity at just the time during early trials that 
it used to excite the cells. These are the key data for which the temporal difference 
model accounts. Under the model, the cells report the temporal difference (TD) 
error for reward, ie the difference in amount of reward that is delivered and the 
amount that is expected. Let r(t) be the amount of reward received at time t and 
v(t) be the prediction of the sum total (undiscounted) reward to be delivered in a 
trial after time t, or: 
v(t) '" L r(T + t) . 
r~O 
The TD component to the dopamine activity is the prediction error: 
c5(t) = r(t) + v(t + 1) - v(t) 
(1) 
(2) 
which uses r(t) + v(t + 1) as an estimate of :Er>or(T + t), so that the TD error is an 
estimate of :Er>or(T + t) - v(t). Provided that the information about state includes 
information ab-out how much time has elapsed since the CS+ was presented (which 
must be available because of the precisely timed nature of the inhibition at the time 
of reward, if the expected reward is not presented), this model accounts well for 
the results in figure 1A. 
The general framework of reinforcement learning methods for Markov decision 
problems (MDPs) extends these results to the case of control. An MDP consists 
of states, actions, transition probabilities between states under the chosen action, 
and the associated rewards with these transitions. The goal of the subject solving a 
MOP is to find a policy (a choice of actions in each state) so as to optimize the sum 
total reward it receives. The TO error 8(t) can be used to learn optimal policies 
by implementing a form of policy iteration, which is an optimal control teclmique 
that is standard in engineering (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996). 
Figures lC;O show that reporting a prediction error for reward does not exhaust 
the behavioral repertoire of the OA cells. Figure lC shows responses to salient, 
novel, stimuli. The dominant effect is that there is a phasic activation of dopamine 
cells followed by a phasic inhibition, both locked to the stimulus. These novelty 
responses decrease over trials, but quite slowly for very salient stimuli (Schultz, 
1998). In some cases, particularly in early trials of appetitive learning (figure lA 
top), there seems to be little or no phasic inhibition of the cells following the acti-
vation. Figure 10 shows what happens when a stimulus (door -) that resembles 
a reward-predicting stimulus (door +) is presented without reinforcement. Again 
a phasic increase over baseline followed by a depression is seen (lower 10). How-
ever, unlike the case in figure 1 B, there is no persistent reward prediction, since 
if a reward is subsequently delivered (unexpectedly), the cells become active (not 
shown) (Schultz, 1998). 
3 Multiplexing and reward distortion 
The most critical issue is whether it is possible to reconcile the behavior of the 
OA cells seen in figures lC;O with the putative computational role of OA in terms 
of reporting prediction error for reward. Intuitively, these apparently anomalous 
responses are benign, that is they do not interfere with the end point of normal 
reward learning, provided that they sum to zero over a trial. 
To see this, consider what happens once learning is complete. If we sum the 
prediction error terms from equation 2, starting from the time of the stimulus 
onset at t = I, we get 
L:t~l 8(t) = v(tend) - v(l) + L:t~l r(t) 
where tend is the time at the end of the trial. Assuming that v(tend)=O and v(l) =0, 
ie that the monkey confines its reward predictions to within a trial, we can see 
that any additional influences on 8(t) that sum to 0 preserve predicted sum future 
rewards. From figure I, this seems true of the majority of the extra responses, ie 
anomalous activation is canceled by anomalous inhibition, though it is not true of 
the uncancelled OA responses shown in figure lA (upper). Altogether, OA activity 
can still be used to learn predictions and choose actions - although it should not 
strictly be referred to solely in terms of prediction error for reward. 
Apart from the issue of anomalous activation that is not canceled (upper figure lA), 
this leaves open two key questions: what drives the extra OA responses; and what 
effects do they have. We offer a set of possible interpretations (mostly associated 
with bonuses) that it is hard to decide between on the basis of current data. 
4 Novelty and Bonuses 
Three very different sorts of bonuses have been considered in reinforcement learn-
ing, novelty, shaping and exploration bonuses. The presence of the first two of 
these is suggested by the responses in figure 1. Bonuses modify the reward signals 
and so change the course of learning. They are mostly used to guide exploration 
of the world, and are typically heuristic ways of addressing the computationally 
intractable exploration-exploitation dilemma. 
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Figure 2: Activity of the DA system given novelty bonuses. The plots show different as-
pects of the TD error 8 as a function of time t within a trial (first three plots in each row) or 
as a function of number T of trials (last two). Upper) A novelty signal was applied for just 
the first timesteps of the stimulus and decayed hyperbolically with trial number as liT. 
Lower) A novelty signal was applied for the first two timesteps of the stimulus and now 
decayed exponentially as e-· 3T to demonstrate that the precise form of decay is irrelevant. 
Trial numbers and times are shown in the plots. The learning rate was E = 0.3. 
We first consider a novelty bonus, which we take as a model for uncancelled anoma-
lous activity. A novelty bonus is a value that is added to states or state-action 
pairs associated with their unfamiliarity - novelty is made intrinsically reward-
ing. This is computationally reasonable, at least in moderation, and indeed it has 
become standard practice in reinforcement learning to use optimistic initial values 
for states to encourage systems to plan to get to novel or unfamiliar states. In TD 
terms, this is like replacing the true environmental reward r(t) at time t with 
r(t) --t r(t) + n(x(t), T) 
where x(t) is the state at time t and n(x(t), T) is the novelty of this state in trial T 
(an index we generally suppress). The effect on the TD error is then 
c5(t) = r(t) + n(x(t), T) + v(t + 1) - v(t) (3) 
The upper plots in figure 2 show the effect of including such an exploration bonus, 
in a case in which just the first timestep of a new stimulus in any given trial are 
awarded a novelty signal which decays hyperbolically to 0 as the stimulus be-
comes more familiar. Here, a novel stimulus is presented for a 25 trials without 
there being any reward consequences. The effect is just a positive signal which de-
creases over time. Learning has no effect on this, since the stimulus cannot predict 
away a novelty signal that lasts only a single timestep. The lower plots in figure 2 
show that it is possible to get partial apparent cancellation through learning, if the 
novelty signal is applied for the first two timesteps of a stimulus (for instance if 
the novelty signal is calculated relatively slowly). In this case, the initial effect is 
just a positive signal (leftmost graph), the effect of TD learning gives it a negative 
transient after a few trials (second plot), and then, as the novelty signal decays to 
0, the effect goes away (third plot). The righthand plots show how c5(t) behaves 
across trials. If there was no learning, then there would be no negative transient. 
The depression of the DA signal comes from the decay of the novelty bonuses. 
Novelty bonuses are true bonuses in the sense that they actually distort the re-
ward function. In particular, this means that we would not expect the sum of the 
extra TD error terms to be 0 across a trial. This property makes them useful, for 
instance, in actually distorting the optimal policy in Markov decision problems to 
ensure that exploration is plmmed and executed in favor of exploitation. However, 
they can be dangerous for exactly the same reason - and there are reports of them 
leading to incorrect behavior, making agents search too much. 
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Figure 3: Activity of the DA system given shaping bonuses (in the same format as figure 2) . 
Upper) The plots show different aspects of the TD error 8 as a function of time t within a 
trial (first three plots) or as a function of number T of trials (last two). Here, the shaping 
bonus comes from a if>(t) = 0 for the first two timesteps a stimulus is presented within a 
trial (t=1;2), and 0 thereafter, irrespective of trial number. The learning rate was to = 0.3. 
Lower) The same plots for to = 0 
In answer to this concern, Ng et al (1999) invented the idea of non-distorting shap-
ing bonuses. Ng et aI's shaping bonuses are guaranteed not to distort optimal poli-
cies, although they can still change the exploratory behavior of agents. This guar-
antee comes because a shaping bonus is derived from a potential function ¢(x) of 
a state, distorting the TD error to 
c5(t) = r(t) + ¢(x(t + 1)) - ¢(x(t)) + v(t + 1) - v(t) (4) 
The difference from the novelty bonus of equation 3 is that the bonus comes from 
the difference between the potential functions for one state and the previous state, 
and they thus cancel themselves out when summed over a trial. Shaping bonuses 
must remain constant for the guarantee about the policies to hold. 
The upper plots in figure 3 show the effect of shaping bonuses on the TD error. 
Here, the potential function is set to the value 1 for the first two time steps of a 
stimulus in a trial, and 0 otherwise. The most significant difference between shap-
ing and novelty bonuses is that the former exhibits a negative transient even in the 
very first trial, whereas, for the latter, it is a learned effect. If the learning rate is 
non-zero, then shaping bonuses are exactly predicted away over the course of nor-
mal learning. Thus, even though the same bonus is provided on trial 25 as trial 1, 
the TD error becomes 0 since the shaping bonus is predicted away. The dynam-
ics of the decay shown in the last two plots is controlled by the learning rate for 
TD. The lower plots show what happens if learning is switched off at the time the 
shaping bonus is provided - this would be the case if the system responsible for 
computing the bonus takes its effect before the inputs associated with the stimulus 
are plastic. In this case, the shaping bonus is preserved. 
The final category of bonus is an ongoing exploration bonus (Sutton, 1990; Dayan 
& Sejnowski, 1996) which is used to ensure continued exploration. Sutton (1990) 
suggested adding to the estimated value of each state (or each state-action pair), a 
number proportional to the length of time since it was last visited. This ultimately 
makes it irresistible to go and visit states that have not been visited for a long 
time. Dayan & Sejnowski (1996) derived a bonus of this form from a model of 
environmental change that justifies the bonus. There is no evidence for this sort 
of continuing exploration bonus in the dopamine data, perhaps not surprisingly, 
since the tasks undertaken by the monkey offer little possibility for any trade-off 
between exploration and exploitation. 
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Figure 4: Activity 5(t) of the dopamine for partial predictability. del = delivered, pred = predicted. 
A;B) CS+ is presented with (A) or surprisingly, without (B) reward. C;D) CS- is presented without (C) 
or surprisingly, with (D) reward. On each trial, an initial stimulus (presented at t = 3 is ambiguous as 
to whether CS+ or CS- is presented (each occurs equally often), and the ambiguity is perfectly resolved 
at t = 4. E;F) The model shows the same behavior. Since the CS± comes at a random interval after the 
cue, the traces are stimulus locked to the relevant events. 
5 Generalization Responses and Partial Observability 
Generalization responses (figure 10) show a persistent effect of stimuli that merely 
resemble a rewarded stimulus. However, animals do not terminally confuse nor-
mally rewarded and normally non-rewarded stimuli, since if a reward is provided 
in the latter case, then it engenders OA activity (as an unexpected reward should), 
and if it is not provided, then there is no depression (as would be the case if an 
expected reward was not delivered) (Schultz, 1998). 
One possibility is that this activity comes from a shaping bonus that is not learned 
away, as in the lower plots of figure 3. An alternative interpretation comes from 
partial observability. If the initial information from the world is ambiguous as 
to whether the stimulus is actually rewarding (door+, called CS+ trials) or non-
rewarding (door-, called CS- trials), because of the similarity, then the animal 
should develop an initial expectation that there could be a reward (whose mean 
value is related to the degree of confusion). This should lead to a partial activation 
of the OA system. If the expectation is canceled by subsequent information about 
the stimulus (available, for instance, following a saccade), then the OA system 
will be inhibited below baseline exactly to nullify the earlier positive prediction. 
If the expectation is confirmed, then there will be continued activity representing 
the difference between the value of the reward and the expected value given the 
ambiguous stimulus. Figure 4 shows an example of this in a simplified case for 
which the animal receives information about the true stimulus over two timesteps, 
the first time step is ambiguous to the tune of 50%; the second perfectly resolves the 
ambiguity. Figures 4A;B show CS+ trials, with and without the delivery of reward; 
figures 4C;0 CS- trials, without and with the delivery of reward. The similarity of 
4A;C to figure 10 is clear. 
Another instance of this generalization response is shown in figure IE. Here, an 
cue light (c±) is provided indicating whether a CS+ or a CS- (d±) is to appear at 
a random later time, which in turn is followed (or not) after a fixed interval by a 
reward (r±). OA cells show a generalization response to the cue light; and then 
fire to the CS+ or are unaffected by the CS-; and finally do not respond to the 
appropriate presence or absence of the cue. Figures 4E;F shows that this is exactly 
the behavior of the model. The OA response stimulus locked to CS+ arises because 
of the variability in the interval between the cue light and the CS+; if this interval 
were fixed, then the cells would only respond to the cue (c+), as in Schultz (1993). 
6 Discussion 
We have suggested a set of interpretations for the activity of the OA system to 
add to that of reporting prediction error for reward. The two theoretically most 
interesting features are novelty and shaping bonuses. The former distort the re-
ward function in such a way to encourage exploration of new stimuli, and new 
places. The latter are non-distorting, and can be seen as being multiplexed by the 
DA system together with the prediction error signal. 
Since shaping bonuses are not distorting they have no ultimate effect on action 
choice. However, the signal provided by the activation (and then cancellation) of 
DA can nevertheless have a significant neural effect. We suggest that DA release 
has unconditional effects in the ventral striatum (perhaps allowing stimuli to be 
read into pre-frontal working memory, Cohen et ai, 1998) and the dorsal striatum 
(perhaps engaging stimulus-directed approach and exploratory orienting behav-
iors, see Ikemoto & Panksepp (1999) for review). For stimuli that actually predict 
rewards (and so cause an initial activation of the DA system), these behaviors are 
often called appetitive; for novel, salient, and potentially important stimuli that are 
not known to predict rewards, they allow the system to pay appropriate attention. 
These effects of DA are unconditional, since they are hard-wired and not learned. 
In the case of partial observability, DA release due to the uncertain prediction of 
reward directly causes further investigation, and therefore resolution of the uncer-
tainty. When unconditional and conditioned behaviors conflict, the former seem 
to dominate, as in the inability of animals to learn to run away from a stimulus in 
order to get food from it. 
The most major lacuna in the model is its lack of one or more opponent processes 
to DA that might report on punishments and the absence of predicted rewards. 
There is substantial circumstantial evidence that this might be one role for sero-
tonin (which itself has unconditional effects associated with fear, fight, and flight 
responses that are opposite to those of DA), but there is not the physiological 
evidence to support or refute this possibility. Understanding the interaction of 
dopamine and serotonin in terms of their conditioned and unconditioned effects is 
a major task for future work. 
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